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www.apsanet.org/mtgs/divisions/division47.cfm. We also an-
ticipate that the short course on Field Methods will be offered
again in 2004.
Newsletter
Thanks to John Gerring’s editorial leadership, the section
newsletter is already among the best of its kind. The newslet-
ter combines up to date information on section activities, sub-
stantial discussion of methodological questions, and useful
information about developments and publications in the disci-
pline.  This second issue is being sent only to section mem-
bers — if you got it from a colleague, we encourage you to
sign up for the section (see below) to receive the newsletter in
the future. The first issue can be downloaded at:  http://asu.edu/
clas/polisci/cqrm/Newsletter.html.
Section Membership and How to Join
The section’s membership doubled from August to Octo-
ber and now stands at more than 475 members. If you are not
already a member, in order to receive this newsletter and en-
joy the other benefits of section membership, please sign up
now.  The procedure for doing so is quick and easy and can be
found at: http://asu.edu/clas/polisci/cqrm/JoinSection.html.
Interpretations of Interpretivism
John Gerring
Boston University
jgerring@bu.edu
What is interpretivism?1   As is common with broad meth-
odological debates, much hinges on matters of definition.
Interpretivism might be defined residually — as non-positiv-
ism.  However, this scarcely clarifies the matter, as noted by
Robert Adcock and David Dessler in their contributions to
this symposium.  We might start with David Laitin’s sugges-
tion that interpretivism refers to interpretation or clarification
— rendering the ambiguous into a clearer form.  This is true
enough, so far as it goes.  However, in current usage the term
seems to carry a good deal more freight.2
At an epistemological level, interpretivism might be
looked upon as a form of truth-construction that relies on tests
of coherence rather than (or in addition to) correspondence
with external reality.  Thus, interpretivists derive meaning by
looking at the context of an action or event, its connection to a
surrounding set of actions, events, and interpretations.
Interpretivism, classically, involves an appeal to an imagined
whole.  The term is also sometimes employed as a broad ru-
bric encompassing all (or most) non-quantitative forms of
analysis within the social sciences.  All interpretivists will agree
that they are in search of “inter-subjective” meanings, which
are contrasted with “subjective” meanings and “objective”
facts.  All interpretivists agree on the importance of closely
attending to the meanings that are attached to a set of actions
or events by the participants under study; interpretivism is self-
consiously actor-centered.  For this reason, interpretivists
sometimes refer to their object of study as textual.  Although
it may not comprise a written text, it nonetheless is approached
in much the same way as a literary critic (or biblical exegete)
approaches a text.  Hence, the link to biblical hermeneutics
and the Verstehen tradition (Gadamer 1975).
In many respects, interpretivism may be regarded as oc-
cupying a middling position between the ideals of naturalism
(aka ‘positivism’) and post-modernism.  It is consistent with
the practice of old-fashioned literary criticism, particularly that
focusing on authorial intentions (Hoy 1982), and with the dis-
ciplines of anthropology and history.  It occupies a small, or
perhaps not so small (again, the matter of definition is cru-
cial), niche in political science and sociology.
Book, Article, and Paper Awards
The section has established the Giovanni Sartori Book
Award, the Alexander L. George Article Award, and the Sara
and George McCune Sage Paper Award.  In the coming weeks
the section will set up committees for these awards, announce
them to section members via email, and post them on the web
site.  Further details on these awards can be found at http://
asu.edu/clas/polisci/cqrm/Awards.html.
Web Site
The section’s web site (http://asu.edu/clas/polisci/cqrm/
QualitativeMethodsAPSA.html) is a work-in-progress, but is
already getting lots of traffic.  As noted above, it has links for
joining the section as well as links on the newsletter and the
section’s awards.  The web site is jointly organized with the
Consortium on Qualitative Research Methods (CQRM) and
has links to CQRM’s January Institute on Qualitative Research
Methods as well as syllabi and working papers.
That’s it for now.  If you have any suggestions for mov-
ing the section forward, I hope you’ll share them with me.
Symposium: Interpretivism
Responses to any of the issues discussed in this symposium or any future symposium may be posted on our web site or, pending
space, in the next issue of the newsletter. (Letters should be sent to the editor as an email attachment.)
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.998743
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The reader will note from the foregoing discussion that
my definition of the subject relies primarily on interpretivism
as it took form in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s in work by Hans-
Georg Gadamer (1975), Clifford Geertz (1973, 1979a, 1979b),
E.D. Hirsch (1967), Albert Hirschman (1970), Alasdair
MacIntyre (1971), Charles Taylor (1985), Georg Henrik von
Wright (1971), and Peter Winch (1958).3   Regrettably – from
the point of view of clarity – the term has been appropriated in
recent years for a range of usages that are difficult to differen-
tiate from post-modernism or post-structuralism.  However,
since the work of Derrida, Lacan, Deleuze, Lyotard, and Fou-
cault is fundamentally at odds with the work of Gadamer et
al., I think it makes sense to keep these two methodological/
epistemological subjects in separate boxes.
With this preliminary definition of the subject on the table,
I shall now turn my attention to several methodological ques-
tions raised by the theory and practice of interpretivism.  Most
of these issues have been vetted previously.  Even so, it may
be helpful by way of entrée to our symposium to run through
the catechism in a peremptory fashion.  Many of these issues
will be touched upon at greater length – and with consider-
ably greater subtlety – in the remaining, more focused, contri-
butions to this symposium.  Consider this an entrée outré into
a difficult subject, a probing of difficult questions.  There will
be ten, in all.
To begin with, it might be questioned whether
interpretivism is better approached as a philosophy of social
science, or even an epistemology, rather than a specific re-
search agenda or method.  There are few interpretivist “hand-
books,” and many philosophical declamations.  This is begin-
ning to change, as recent Sage catalogs attest.  Even so, the
status of interpretivism seems somewhat different from its
paradigmatic competitors, rational choice and behavioralism,
which eschew philosophical discussion and are eminently prac-
tical (in the sense of showing practitioners how to practice the
trade).  Behavioralism and interpretivism are reverse-images
of each other in this respect; one offers a ‘bare-foot’ program
of research, the other a program of reflection with some sug-
gestions about the practical business of studying social phe-
nomena.  Indeed, the most influential interpretivists (e.g.,
Gadamer, Hirschman, MacIntyre, Ricoeur, Taylor, Winch) are
best known for their general-philosophical statements, not for
their fieldwork (Geertz is a notable exception).  Many are phi-
losophers by trade.  Thus, one might wonder whether we are
comparing apples and oranges when we compare interpretivism
with its supposed rivals.  Arguably, the intention of
interpretivism is to question the epistemological underpinnings
of all work in the social sciences, not to show anyone how to
do it.  It addresses the question, What is it that we are doing
when we do social science?, not How should we do social
science?  I do not intend to engage these epistemological de-
bates here; I raise them only because they bear directly on this
symposium.  Here, we are treating interpretivism as a pur-
ported method.  Whether it is appropriate to do so is the first
question that we ought to consider.  If it is not, then we have
embarked on a fundamentally misguided venture.
Second, does interpretivism refer simply to non-causal
explanations (aka descriptive propositions), proximal causal
arguments or causal processes?4   Or, alternatively, does
interpretivism also invite speculation about deep-rooted (‘struc-
tural’) causal factors?  Plausibly, close attention to actor ratio-
nality and to the particulars of a given research setting pre-
clude the consideration of long-distance causes.  Indeed, one
finds few such arguments in the interpretivist canon.  Here,
causes are often treated as ‘constitutive’ (Wendt 1998, 1999),
or as indistinct ‘processes’ where the cause and effect are so
intermingled that it is difficult to tell one from the other.  There
are few exogenous causal factors in the interpretive universe.
At the same time, interpretivists do not appear to have given
up on big-C causation.  Thus, it remains a point of ambiguity.
Third, does interpretivism generate propositions (descrip-
tive or causal) that are falsifiable?  Do their research programs,
invoking a phrase from Lakatos, culminate in testable argu-
ments? Alternately stated, how many interpretations of a given
social phenomenon are possible, and how might one deter-
mine good interpretations from bad ones?  This discussion is
clouded over by a degree of ambiguity surrounding the con-
cept of falsifiability, which Popper saw, quite properly, as a
matter of degrees (Popper 1934/1968), and which subsequent
work has further amended (e.g., Lakatos 1978).  But the gen-
eral idea is not in doubt.  In order to be considered true, or
possibly true (Popper himself affected an extreme epistemo-
logical skepticism), an argument must risk the possibility of
being false.  This means, in practical terms, that propositions,
and the research programs that they are embedded in, should
be specific about the outcomes that they seek to describe or
explain; they should identify rival hypotheses; they should
identify a research design (a specifiable procedure) to test the
proposition, as well as rival hypotheses; and this research de-
sign should be replicable, so that future scholars can revisit
the matter.  I am employing scientistic jargon here, but the
basic ideas are not alien to rational thought in all areas, as
Popper constantly sought to emphasize.  In any case, there is
room for argument over the extent to which interpretivists a)
embrace the norm of falsifiability and b) achieve it in their
work.
Fourth, does interpretivism exclude a consideration of
factors that lie outside the ‘intersubjective’ realm – i.e., they
are not constituted primarily by actors or by language but are,
rather, objective (existing independently of human perception)?
What about, for instance, the role of biological features of the
human condition such as cognitive processing (Lakoff 1987);
geography (Diamond 1997); or abstract institutions such as
an electoral system (Taagepera and Shugart 1989)?  Consider,
as well, motivations that are in some sense universal rather
than culturally constructed such as self-interest (the corner-
stone of rational choice).  Are all these issues outside the pur-
view of interpretivism?  Of course, interpretivists might re-
spond that these factors enter the realm of interpretivism inso-
far as they are culturally constructed.  Even so, this means
that interpretivists are limited to examining the particular within
the universal.  Thus, while interpretivists might acknowledge,
with Chomsky, that language contains some purely cognitive
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(pre-cultural) factors, language evidently takes different forms
at different times and places.  The interpretivist would pre-
sumably be interested in the latter, not the former.  Ditto for
factors such as geographies and electoral systems; they pro-
vide a universal structure within which differences appear.
This discussion raises an important issue of a substantive
nature.  Does interpretivism commit one to a view of the world
that grants causal priority to intersubjectivity (i.e., to culture,
language, or thought) vis-à-vis various objective/structural
factors?  Evidently, one is not likely to be terribly interested in
studying intersubjective meanings if these are largely super-
structural.  For the Marxist, the rational-choicer, and the cul-
tural materialist (e.g., Harris 1979), intersubjective meanings
are interesting only as dependent variables.  In the writings of
interpretivists, one finds implicit agreement on what one might
label the relative autonomy of culture or intersubjectivity.
Turtles rest upon turtles rest upon turtles; there is no ultimate
ground.  Social science is all about interpretations, ultimately.
Fifth, is quantitative analysis excluded from the
interpretivist palette?  Does one leave the realm of
interpretivism as soon as one begins to count?  For example,
one might question why a study that involves talking to a small
number of people in an unstructured manner (Hochschild 1981;
Lane 1962) is interpretivist while talking to a large number of
people in a more structured format (Campbell et al. 1960; Verba
et al. 1995) is not.  The issue of numeracy, particularly as per-
tains to survey research, is addressed at length in Laura Stoker’s
and Dvora Yanow’s contributions to this symposium.  Although
it seems to be generally understood that interpretivists do not
rely primarily on things that can be counted to reach insight
into a topic (is there a single example of an interpretivist work
based primarily on quantitative analysis?), they certainly do
not exclude themselves from the realm of quantitative analy-
sis.  Again, one encounters an element of ambiguity in how
interpretivism should be defined.
Sixth, how much leeway should the observer be granted
in the act of interpretation?  Are meanings understandable by
the participants to be granted priority over meanings that lie
outside the consciousness and language of participants?  How
much ‘abstraction’ from the brute facts should be allowed?
Interpretivists do not generally go as far as ethnomethodologists
(Garfinkel 1967) in this regard; they believe that some sort of
reconstruction is necessary.  But it is rather unclear (and rarely
addressed) how much analytical license may be granted, while
still remaining within the interpretive tradition.  To clarify this
zone of ambiguity, interpretivists may wish to appeal to the
proper boundaries of a given intersubjective realm (‘culture’);
they are particularly reticent to generalize on a global scale
(MacIntyre 1971).  Yet, the appeal to cultural specificity pre-
sumes that cultures have clear boundaries.  As it happens, this
is not an assumption that most contemporary interpretivists
would feel comfortable in making.  Hence, the enduring prob-
lem of abstraction.  If cultures are now global, does that mean
that we can (must?) move to a global scale?
A seventh issue is closely related.  To what extent does
interpretivism allow one to generalize about the world (in ei-
ther a causal or descriptive vein)?  Interpretivism is usually
regarded as a particularizing art.  However, it is important to
emphasize that this matter, like all judgments of size, is rela-
tive.  Thus, the question is not whether to generalize, but how
much to generalize.  Indeed, relative to post-modernist/post-
structuralist work (Clifford 1988; Rosenau 1992),
interpretivists are unabashed generalizers.  Yet, against the
backdrop of mainstream social science interpretivists usually
find themselves on the particularistic end of the spectrum.  They
tend to emphasize the shortcomings of ‘grand’ theory, the ex-
tent to which local practices resist generalization, the particu-
larity of context, the contingency of human action (see essay
by Mark Bevir in this symposium).  The very notion of ‘con-
text,’ an important term in the interpretivist lexicon, suggests
a smaller setting than is usual for the nomothetically-inclined
social sciences.  Local knowledge is prized; general knowl-
edge distrusted.
Quite obviously, if grand generalizations are wrong then
they are wrong and should simply be abandoned.  This is, ar-
guably, a question of fact.  However, it seems more likely that
we are facing what one might call a question of academic aes-
thetics rather than a question of ontological truth.  Interpretivists
do not deny the universal features of human cognition, geog-
raphy, and ‘institutions’; they feel strongly, however, that this
is not where the action is.  Non-interpretivists feel just as
strongly that their job is to abstract from the particular; that
the really interesting (theoretically fruitful) facts are those
which are common to a number of disparate settings.  It is
difficult to avoid the conclusion that one is at the horns of a
particularly irresolvable dilemma about what sort of truths are
useful truths.  Should we aim to explain a great deal about a
little bit, or a little bit about a great deal?  Each, one might say,
offers a simplification of reality, but these two approaches –
the ‘splitting’ and ‘lumping’ – simplify in quite different ways.5
This point is nicely underscored in Dessler’s essay (below).
An eighth issue is even harder to pin down, but deserves
vetting anyway.  Is interpretivism a left-wing, or ‘critical,’
method?  There is a general sense that interpretivists occupy
the left wing of the contemporary social sciences.  This was
not always the case; certainly it was not so in the time of
Dilthey, when science was still very much on the side of
Progress and Progress was still on socialism’s side.  We should
recall that Marxism still carried scientific credentials in the
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.  Otto Neurath, a lead-
ing member of the Vienna Circle (whose members came to be
referred to as Logical Positivists), was a Marxist sympathizer
and, according to Gillies (1993: 24), was “in charge of central
planning in the temporary Spartacist government set up in
Bavaria after the first world war.”  Other members of the Vienna
Circle also leaned toward the Left in the interwar years.
However, by the end of the twentieth century, with the
onset of the Cold war, the upheavals of the 1960s, and the
apparent demise of communist as a progressive ideology, sci-
ence changed sides, beginning to look more and more like a
handmaiden of the establishment.  I do not wish to imply, there-
fore, that an interpretivist method conditions a critical or left-
wing attitude toward the mainstream.  Evidently, the relation-
ship between method and substance changes over time and
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may yet change again.  Nor do I wish to suggest that the prac-
tice of an interpretivist method, by itself, inclines one to a
critical opinion vis-à-vis the status quo.  One can be a left-
wing interpretivist as well as a right-wing interpretivist.  It
seems more likely that the association between interpretivism
and radicalism flows from a more general feature of late-twen-
tieth century academics in the US (and perhaps elsewhere):
those in the humanities are more left-wing than those in the
‘hard’ sciences (Ladd and Lipset 1975).  The fact is worth
mentioning only because it is my impression that political/
ideological issues lie just below the surface of many debates
between interpretivism and its (right-wing?) twin, positivism.
Ninth, there are set of questions pertaining to
interpretivism’s proper place in contemporary political science
(or social science more generally), an issue addressed by all
the participants in this symposium (at least implicitly).  Is
interpretivism a distinctive way of doing business, as implied
by Adcock and Bevir and argued strongly by Yanow, or is it
better understood as indicating an important element of all (or
most) social-scientific work, as argued by Laitin?  If the former,
should we think of interpretivism as a complement to other
(‘positivist’) methods, as Stoker and Dessler suggest, or an
opponent?  Do interpretivist studies cumulate with non-
interpretivist work?  Or are they – to take the most radical
view – incommensurable?  If the latter, how might we adjudi-
cate between studies of the same general subject that are
interpretivist and non-interpretivist (or is it, essentially, a non-
rational leap of faith)?  Are interpretivist studies ‘better’ than
non-interpretivist studies?  Do we need more or less
interpretivism, or are the proportions, at present, just about
right?
Evidently, to claim that interpretivist work is valuable and
important and deserving of an honored place in the social sci-
ence universe is not to say that all other sorts of work should
cease to exist.  (I anticipate that few interpretivists would take
this position.)  My hunch is that much of the agonized debate
over interpretivism – as with the equally agonized debate over
rational choice – may be understood as a matter of achieving a
proper proportion, and a mutually complementary interplay,
among diverse research approaches.  This observation does
not resolve methodological debate; indeed, it invites debate
(for how else are we to sort out the proportions?).  However, it
does put the resulting debate into a more hopeful, and more
practical, frame.
Finally, there are ongoing and seemingly irresolvable
questions about how to define ‘interpretivism.’  We return,
thus, to the opening topic of this short essay.  I raise the defi-
nitional question again at this juncture only to remind readers
that much of what has been said is contingent upon a certain
definition of what interpretivism is.  Indeed, in circulating early
drafts of this essay I was struck by how often I received the
response that, while true of some interpretivists, what I had to
say was not true of others.6   I am quite sure that this is indeed
the case.
Perhaps this is the proper point to end this initial foray
into a complex and important subject, and to open the floor to
other interpretations of interpretivism.
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Interpretation
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If we mean by an interpretation a rendering of an am-
biguous input into a clear but partial output [or as the OED
puts it, “expound the meaning of… something abstruse…to
render meanings…clear and explicit”], then all social scien-
tists are interpretivists.1  Those in the social sciences who di-
vide the methodological universe into interpretivists and (say)
positivists are creating what Dewey has called an “untenable
dualism.” It would be like, as Pitkin has ironically observed in
a related context, dividing up the world into herrings and
fruits.2  It can be done, but with little profit for understanding
the world.
Interpretation involves a mix between art and logic. Am-
biguous inputs (for example, a year of New York Times ar-
ticles) lend themselves to a near infinity of partial meanings.
Seeing something original, a pattern that has yet been seen
before, involves artistry. However, seeing if the pattern is real,
and not merely like one of Hamlet’s interpretations of a cloud
formation that Polonius accepts wholeheartedly (though a bit
obsequiously), requires a set of diagnostic tests that are ruled
by logic.
All science entails both the artistic and logical elements
of interpretation, though there is no standard sequence, as these
are two interactive processes. The artistic element is essen-
tially theory, in Sheldon Wolin’s sense of an encompassing
vision.3  The logical element requires a set of diagnostics.  In-
terpreters of data want to know if the general principle that
lies behind their interpretation is valid for a range of cases
beyond the case at hand. The more violations – or as Thomas
Kuhn calls them, anomalies – the less confidence one would
have in the interpretation.4  Interpreters will also want to know
whether the logical implications of their vision are valid. De-
riving observable implications of a vision and seeing whether
they are valid is a standard tool of interpretation, whether per-
formed by self-designated interpretivists or positivists.
To demonstrate the proposition of the universality of the
two elements of the interpretive act, I draw on the iconic clas-
sic of political interpretation (Karl Marx’s Eighteenth Brumaire
of Louis Napoleon) and of sociological positivism (Emile
Durkheim’s Suicide). Marx’s journalistic essay exemplifies the
best in theoretically based narrative. The sardonic irony that
pervades every section makes this essay gripping, the highest
form of theoretically guided narrative. But the attention to his-
torical detail, the weaving of a coherent story linked to larger
historical forces, and the attention to apparent anomalies, make
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Endnotes
1I am grateful for feedback on various early drafts of this essay
from Robert Adcock, Mark Bevir, David Dessler, David Laitin and
Dvora Yanow.  It has greatly benefited from their careful, and not
uncritical, attention.
2I understand Laitin’s essay to be arguing in a prescriptive mode;
this is what we should be defining as interpretivism, he seems to be
arguing.  Here, I shall approach the subject from the perspective of
normal usage.  Interpretivism is a) what people say it is and b) what
so-called interpretivists do.
3For useful compendiums, see Gibbons (1987), Natanson
(1962), and Rabinow and Sullivan (1979).
4Sometimes, this issue is framed in terms of a dichotomy be-
tween explanation and understanding, as Adcock notes.  However,
since interpretivists do not seem to equate the former with causal
argument and the latter with arguments of a descriptive sort, these
terms are not helpful.
5A more complicated methodological issue beckons.  While
interpretivists generally present the particularizing move as the safer
move, since it does not presume cross-cultural equivalences, it is
important to note that particularizing statements also – by implica-
tion – generalize.  To say, for example, that Germany is fascist is to
imply that either that a) other countries are not fascist or b) that they
are.  Either (a) nor (b) is always implied; otherwise, the proposition
about German fascism (and indeed, the very meaning of fascism) is
nonsensical.  In this limited sense, particularistic statements are also
general statements.
6In this respect, the debate over interpretivism reiterates a per-
sistent feature of the ongoing debate over rational choice.  As the
reader may recall, Don Green and Ian Shapiro (1994) issued a widely
read and sharply critical evaluation of work in this genre nearly a
decade ago.  This was followed by a series of defenses and counter-
attacks, many of which tried to show that Green and Shapiro’s defi-
nition of rational choice was narrow and un-representative (Cox
1999).  Again, much seemed to hinge on matters of definition.
